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Abstract Cultural evolutionary theory has been alternatively compared to a theory of forces, such as 
Newtonian mechanics, or the kinetic theory of gases. In this article, I clarify the scope and 
significance of these metatheoretical characterisations. First, I discuss the kinetic analogy, which has 
been recently put forward by Tim Lewens. According to it, cultural evolutionary theory is grounded 
on a bottom-up methodology, which highlights the additive effects of social learning biases on the 
emergence of large-scale cultural phenomena. Lewens supports this claim by arguing that it is a 
consequence of cultural evolutionists’ widespread commitment to population thinking. While I concur 
with Lewens that cultural evolutionists often actually conceive cultural change in aggregative terms, I 
think that the kinetic framework does not properly account for the explanatory import of population-
level descriptions in cultural evolutionary theory. Starting from a criticism of Lewens’ interpretation 
of population thinking, I argue that the explanatory role of such descriptions is best understood within 
a dynamical framework – that is, a framework according to which cultural evolutionary theory is a 
theory of forces. After having spelled out the main features of this alternative interpretation, I 
elucidate in which respects it helps to outline a more accurate characterisation of the overarching 
structure of cultural evolutionary theory.  
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Pursuing a generalised explanatory framework for evolutionary change, biologists have 
repeatedly attempted, over the past 150 years, to ground evolutionary theory on a supposed 
analogy with physical theories, most notably Newtonian mechanics or the kinetic theory of 
gases. According to the Newtonian analogy – one version of which was arguably already 
defended by Darwin (Depew and Weber 1996) – evolutionary theory is a theory of forces. 
This is to say, roughly, that its explanatory import originates from the fact that it identifies, as 
possible causes of evolutionary change, a compact set of factors (selection, genetic drift, 
mutation, migration, recombination, etc.) perturbing the supposed “inertial state” of a 
population (which has been alternatively identified with the Malthusian growth model, the 
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, the tendency towards complexity, etc.). By contrast, the kinetic 
analogy – whose first formulation is sometimes attributed to Fisher (1930) – stresses the 
statistical features of evolutionary theory (or, more specifically, of its mathematical core, that 
is, population genetics). From this perspective, evolutionary change is nothing more than the 
by-product of a myriad of individual interactions – just like thermodynamic macro-
phenomena, such as temperature or pressure changes – between organisms and between 
organisms and the environment. The explanatory import of evolutionary theory is in this case 
identified by its ability to predict the aggregative effects of these interactions.  
Interestingly, both analogies have also made an appearance – albeit in a somehow different 
form – in the recent debate on the explanatory status of cultural evolutionary theory. On the 
one hand, Richerson and Boyd – among many others cultural evolutionists – have 
characterised cultural evolutionary theory as a theory of forces: 
 
We call the processes that cause the culture to change forces of cultural evolution. We 
divide the evolving system into two parts. One is the “inertial” part – the processes that 
tend to keep the population the same from one time period to the next. In this model 
cultural inertia comes from unbiased sampling and faithful copying of models. The other 
part consists of the forces – the processes that cause changes in the numbers of different 
types of cultural variants in the population. These processes overcome the inertia and 
generate evolutionary change (Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 68; emphasis in the original).  
 
On the other hand, Tim Lewens (2009, 2015) has argued that cultural evolutionary theory is 




evolutionary models rarely derives from the reference to some cultural equivalent of 
selection, drift or other evolutionary forces. Cultural evolutionary models instead interpret 
cultural change as the aggregative outcome of the interactions between social learners 
endowed by specific cognitive biases and preferences. 
In this article, the scope and significance of these analogies for cultural evolutionary theory 
will be discussed. To put it boldly, I think that the main difference between the Newtonian – 
or dynamical – approach and the kinetic approach is that they rely on different interpretations 
of one of the basic tenets of cultural evolutionary theory, that is, population thinking. The 
kinetic framework puts emphasis on a bottom-up methodology, to highlight the additive 
effects of social learning biases on the emergence of large-scale cultural phenomena. The 
focus of the dynamical framework, on the contrary, is on populations of traits. Rather than 
trying to understand how social learners’ cognitive biases add up, the dynamical perspective 
seeks to integrate information about social learning biases with information about other 
evolutionary factors, so as to provide a more general picture of the causes of cultural change. 
I believe that both approaches are defensible and provide important insights about cultural 
evolution and the strategies adopted in order to model it. Still, I shall argue that, ultimately, 
the Newtonian analogy offers a more comprehensive framework for cultural evolutionary 
theory.  
In order to support this claim, I shall first show why the kinetic view defended by Lewens 
does not do justice to some aspects of cultural evolutionary theory. To this aim, in section 2, 
Lewens’ position will be illustrated in some detail. In particular, I shall focus on Lewens’ 
criticisms against the explanatory centrality of population-level descriptions in cultural 
evolutionary theory, stressing the link between Lewens’ view and his specific interpretation 
of population thinking. In section 3, it will be argued that this is not the only available – nor 
the most largely supported – characterisation of population thinking. I will thus show how an 
alternative interpretation may shed a different light on population-level descriptions of 
cultural change. In section 4, I shall introduce the dynamical framework and, in section 5, I 
shall maintain that it plays a foundational role in cultural evolutionary theory. In the 








2. The kinetic approach to cultural evolutionary theory 
 
In accordance with a largely shared view, the core of cultural evolutionary theory is 
constituted by the models that Boyd and Richerson and their collaborators (especially Joseph 
Henrich) built within the so-called dual-inheritance theory. According to dual-inheritance 
theory, culture is differential transmission and accumulation of learned information. The type 
of information that is transmitted and accumulated is largely dependent on our hard-wired 
preferences for certain kinds of behaviour. Biological evolution provided human beings with 
characteristic social learning biases, which have proven adaptive in relatively stable 
environments, wherein individual trial-and-error learning is unnecessarily costly.1 The social 
learning biases include the disproportionate imitation/emulation of the most common type 
(conformism), the most successful type (model-based or prestige bias) – the former or, 
occasionally, both of these biases are also called context-based biases – and the most 
attractive, memorable or useful type, according to some psychological preference (content 
biases).2  
Once a new cultural variant (an artefact, a belief, an item of knowledge, a word, a symbol, a 
skill, a norm, etc.) is generated – through a process that is somehow analogous to genetic 
mutation, but possibly more directed (directed variation) –, its subsequent distribution is 
influenced by its attractiveness (due to content biases) and the distribution of other cultural 
variants (due to context-based biases) plus migration, drift, and natural selection. Natural 
selection acts in cultural evolution by eliminating cultural variants that are too detrimental 
from a biological point of view. In spite of this, cultural evolutionary theory predicts a large 
degree of autonomy for cultural accumulation. Provided that social learning is less costly or 
more effective than individual trial-and-error, partially maladaptive cultural variants may be 
maintained within a population, evolve and even subvert “genetically-coded” behaviours. 
According to the mainstream view in cultural evolution theory, cultural variants are not 
                                                             
1 This claim, as well as other dual-inheritance theorists’ statements concerning the biological evolution of the 
cognitive and behavioural faculties, has been criticised from different standpoints. More research is surely 
needed in order to better understand which are the evolutionary and developmental factors that have had a major 
impact on originating and moulding cooperative and social psychology. I would like to stress, nonetheless, that 
the details on human evolution and the origin of social skills, although obviously fundamental for a more 
realistic picture of cultural change processes, do not automatically prove or undermine specific conceptions of 
the dynamics of cultural change. Although, if it was eventually found that cultural transmission is completely 
disanalogous to biological inheritance, there would good reason to dismiss dual-inheritance theory, other minor 
adjustments to the specific mechanisms involved in social learning may be easily tolerated and incorporated into 
it. 
2 This picture has been somehow complexified by recent research (see, for instance, Kendal et al. 2018). For 




autonomous replicators similar to genes (this conception – largely criticised – is usually 
associated with memetics; Dawkins 1976). Instead, they are usually considered to be a class 
of psychological or behavioural phenotypic traits – whose specificity is, precisely, that they 
are culturally transmitted – or, in the case of artefacts, written languages or symbols, objects 
carrying information potentially influencing phenotypic traits: they are sometimes conceived 
as making up a culturally constructed ecological niche (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). In spite of 
the differences between genes and cultural variants, cultural transmission is nonetheless 
usually considered faithful enough to guarantee a stable and efficient channel of inheritance 
for the latter.3 This similarity between genetic inheritance and cultural transmission – along 
with the commonplace observation that in the cultural domain there is plenty of variation – 
led some authors (most notably Durham 1991; Mesoudi 2011) to explicitly characterise the 
action of content and/or context-based biases on the distributions of cultural variants as a 
process of “cultural selection”.  
Thus, there are two possible characterisations of cultural change: as the product of individual 
interactions between beings endowed with specific social learning biases or as an 
evolutionary process involving cultural variant distributions. Against the explanatory import 
of the latter characterisation, Lewens (2015, chap. 2) observes that biological evolutionary 
concepts have been traditionally translated to the cultural domain in a rather loose manner. 
More specifically, it is possible to maintain that, in the context of dual-inheritance theory, 
cultural evolutionary descriptions are either explanatorily vacuous or redundant.  
Concerning the vacuity charge, Lewens’ criticism – echoing Popper’s tautology objections 
against Darwinian theory (Baravalle 2018) – is related to the difficulty of defining in a non-
trivial or non-circular way the notion of “cultural fitness”, which is supposedly crucial to 
make sense of cultural selection. The strength of this objection is questionable since, as 
recently argued by Ramsey and De Block (2017), the difficulties in formulating an 
operational definition of cultural fitness are likely not insurmountable. Moreover, Lewens 
himself seems to acknowledge that this problem is not as fatal as it would seem at first 
glance. More serious is, in his opinion, the redundancy charge. By analysing major works in 
cultural evolutionary theory – most notably, Henrich and Boyd (1998) on the effects of 
conformism in the diffusion of a cultural trait and Henrich and Boyd (2002) on the 
characteristics of cultural transmission – Lewens notices that their explanatory pay-off does 
not derive from the use of the notion of cultural selection, but rather from the fact that they 
                                                             




account for the aggregative effects of social learning (Lewens 2015, p. 38). This claim can be 
generalised, in Lewens’ opinion, to most cultural evolutionary models built within the dual-
inheritance tradition. 
In order to theoretically ground this position, Lewens invokes bibliographic evidence, mainly 
drawn from Boyd and Richerson’s work, stating that “they affiliate their approach to a 
Darwinian tradition in a manner that does not place selection in the foreground, but which 
instead stresses the importance of population thinking” (Lewens 2015, p. 16; emphasis in the 
original). As is well known, this concept was introduced by Ernst Mayr in order to highlight, 
from a historical point of view, the differences between the Darwinian notion of species and 
previous typological interpretations. Similarly, population thinking is employed by cultural 
evolutionists to highlight the contrast between cultural evolutionary theory and those 
conceptions of culture that postulate intrinsic tendencies in cultural change (Richerson and 
Boyd 2005, p. 58 ff.; Lewens 2009, 2015, pp. 35-6). Nineteenth-century social evolutionism 
is a good example of such non-populationist conceptions. Anthropologists such as Lewis 
Henry Morgan or Edward Tylor conceived cultural change as an unfolding of stages towards 
higher degrees of civilisation, and saw deviations with respect to the “ideal path” as 
accidents. Albeit with differences concerning what the essence of history is taken to be, some 
Freudian or Marxian approaches to the social sciences arguably still adopt this form of 
typological thinking (Rosenberg 2016, chap. 8). By contrast, for population thinking-based 
cultural evolutionism, there is no previous “plan” for cultural change; the diversity and 
variability of human cultures is primitive, and cannot be explained by invoking hidden 
tendencies.  
I take all of this as uncontroversial. However – Lewens keeps arguing – there is another, in 
his opinion more significant, sense in which population thinking influences the explanatory 
strategy of cultural evolutionary modellers. It is in virtue of this second sense that cultural 
evolutionary theory can be assimilated to a kinetic theory. In a frequently cited passage, Mayr 
states that population thinking is the claim that: 
 
All organisms and organic phenomena are composed by unique features and can be 
described collectively only in statistical terms. Individuals, or any kind of organic entities, 
form populations of which we can determine the arithmetic mean and the statistics of 
variation. Averages are mere statistical abstractions; only the individuals of which the 
populations are composed have reality (1959 [2006], p. 326). 
 




crediting “only individuals with ‘reality’ and hints at least at a scepticism regarding the 
explanatory importance of population-level properties” (Lewens 2009, p. 248), such as the 
distribution of a cultural variant. This is why cultural evolutionists would see cultural change 
as similar to thermodynamic macro-phenomena; both are best explained in terms of the 
interactions between smaller components, such that “by adding up these interactions in 
statistically sophisticated ways we can understand the behaviour of the aggregate” (Lewens 
2015, p. 17). More specifically, cultural change would be explained – at least in most cases – 
by adding up instances of learning, in turn characterised in accordance with the peculiar 
preferences supposedly at work in the human group being studied. Contrarily, descriptions of 
cultural change offered in terms of cultural evolutionary pressures acting on distributions of 
cultural variants would be merely statistical abstractions. Since it would be impossible to 
track all instances of learning occurring in a population at a certain time, such descriptions 
are often valuable, but are not identifying a “real” (i.e., causal) process in its own right. 
Lewens (2015, chap. 7) admits that the kinetic approach, as presented above, might not be 
entirely satisfactory in accounting for certain cultural phenomena in which, apparently, the 
distribution of cultural variants is not a direct function of individuals’ preferences. This is the 
case for phenomena of cultural change occurring in populations with a complex demic 
structure and/or in populations in which powerful or institutional actors play important roles. 
However, even in these cases, Lewens believes that cultural evolutionists typically attempt to 
understand the behaviour of the whole population by decomposing it into interacting similar 
parts (groups, structured networks of powerful people, etc.) in a way that, again, is 
reminiscent of the modus operandi of the kinetic theory of gases.4  
 
 
3. Population thinking and distribution explanations 
 
As aforementioned, two of the most well-known models cited by Lewens supporting his 
kinetic view are Henrich and Boyd (1998) and Henrich and Boyd (2002).5 Their shared goal 
is to defend dual-inheritance theory by showing that the characterisation of social learning 
                                                             
4 Notice, by the way, that Lewens is not arguing that this is the right way to explain cultural change, but just that 
cultural evolutionists typically explain it in these terms. 
5 Other models discussed by Lewens are, for instance, Henrich (2001) and Salganik et al. (2006). I assume that 





features that this theory proposes (as described in section 2) accounts for observed large-scale 
phenomena (the evolution of conformism and the emergence of between-group differences in 
the case of Henrich and Boyd 1998, and the stability of cultural information through cultural 
transmission processes in Henrich and Boyd 2002). In order to accomplish this, both sets of 
models explain how the cognitive abilities or biases that characterise cultural transmission in 
human beings have been naturally selected in virtue of the fact that the dynamics that they 
implement are globally adaptive. The explanations that these models provide are indeed 
plausibly aggregative, as held by Lewens, because the overall adaptiveness of the cognitive 
biases is actually a consequence of the fact that humans individually interact in a certain way. 
Both Henrich and Boyd’s models provide origin explanations of cultural dynamics. 
According to Peter Godfrey-Smith, this kind of explanation is typically “directed on the fact 
that a population has come to contain individuals or a particular kind at all” (Godfrey-Smith 
2009, p. 42; emphasis in the original) – in this case, individuals able to implement certain 
types of social interactions. Arguably, not all cultural evolutionary models have this goal. 
Frequently “we assume the existence of a set of variants in a population, and explain why 
they have the distribution they do or why their distribution has changed” (Godfrey-Smith 
2009, p. 42). This is what Godfrey-Smith calls a distribution explanation. Henrich and 
Boyd’s models account for the overall conditions (i.e., the presence of individuals able to 
socially interact in a certain way) that allow for certain cultural dynamics to emerge. They 
however do not say very much about how – once such dynamics have emerged and, as a 
consequence, a certain amount of cultural variation becomes available – subsequent changes 
in the distribution of cultural variants occur. Although Lewens may be right that origin 
explanations are typically provided in kinetic terms, this conclusion cannot be automatically 
extended to distribution explanations (see also footnote 1). 
While the influence of individual psychologies and the importance of aggregation in cultural 
evolutionary dynamics are uncontroversial, I do not think that the explanations provided in 
terms of cultural evolutionary pressures are secondary, or merely accessory, in distribution 
explanations. On the contrary, I believe that they are indispensable in order to detect causes 
of cultural evolution that are not directly resulting from aggregation or, at least, whose 
explanatory import is not reducible to the fact that they are resulting from an aggregation.  
In order to introduce my point, I would like to question Lewens’ understanding of the role of 
population thinking in cultural evolutionary theory. As Lewens (2015, p. 16) himself 




the most widely endorsed. As a matter of fact, many of Mayr’s commenters (Sober 1980; 
Morrison 2004; Hey 2011) have noticed that the reference to population-level properties as 
abstractions is problematic, since in biology it is generally accepted that populations are not 
collections of individuals arbitrarily taken, but instead are “real” interbreeding communities. 
After all, Mayr was a realist concerning species, and this metaphysical position is arguably at 
odds with the deflationist view that he apparently defends in the passage cited above.  
Although there is, of course, a sense in which the Darwinian populational perspective implies 
a focus on individual idiosyncrasies and differences (contrary to typological thinking), there 
is another sense in which “population thinking involves ignoring individuals” (Sober 1980, p. 
370; emphasis in the original). While, in fact, on the one hand “the typologist formulates a 
causal hypothesis about the forces at work on each individual within a population … the 
populationist, on the other hand, tries to identify invariances by ascending to a different level 
of organisation”. The invariant property that is at stake in population thinking “is the amount 
of variability, and this is a property of populations” (p. 370; emphasis in the original). 
According to Sober, the difference between non-population and population thinking is thus, 
in a way, the opposite of that suggested by Lewens. While “essentialism pursued an 
individualistic (organismic) methodology … the populationist point of view made possible by 
evolutionary theory made such reductionistic demands unnecessary” (p. 381). This is because 
Darwinian population thinking allowed biologists to see that “populations and their properties 
… have their own causal efficiency” (p. 381). 
A somehow intermediate position between Mayr’s and Sober’s is defended, in the context of 
cultural evolutionary theory, by McElreath and Henrich (2007). According to these authors, 
population thinking does not entail a reduction of population-level dynamics to individual-
level interactions (this would be more characteristic of methodological individualism in social 
sciences), nor a reduction of individual-level interactions to population-level dynamics (this 
would be tantamount to adopt a sort of holism). Instead, it entails an interplay between the 
two levels. Given a certain demic structure, individuals interact with neighbours and with the 
environment, thus determining the composition of the population in terms of cultural 
variants. However, the other way around, cultural variants influence, in virtue of their 
distribution and functional properties, the demic structure and, therefore, individuals’ 
behaviours and interactions.  
A similar conception was already defended by Boyd and Richerson (1985): 
 




causes of the large-scale and long-term patterns of society in terms of events in the lives of 
individuals. This is a misperception. In our models the two levels are reciprocally linked; 
large-scale processes affect small-scale phenomena, and vice versa. We take the group (or 
population) of individuals as our fundamental unit. A group can be characterised by the 
number of individuals who exhibit each different cultural variant. We refer to this as the 
“distribution of cultural variants” (or phenotypes) within the group. To understand why a 
group is characterised by a particular distribution of cultural variants, we must understand 
the forces of cultural evolution that act on members of the group. Some of these forces have 
their origin in the psychology of individuals … Other forces are the result of larger-scale 
social processes (Boyd and Richerson 1985, pp. 23-4). 
 
I have cited this excerpt integrally because it displays two aspects of cultural evolutionary 
theory that are, in my opinion, underestimated by Lewens.  
The first aspect is that, as also noted by McElreath and Henrich, cultural evolutionary theory 
does not support any reductionism as the one implicit in Lewens’ interpretation of population 
thinking. In order to explain cultural change, it is not enough to decompose the phenomenon 
into its basic elements, but it is also necessary to take into account the characteristics of the 
population as a whole. The second aspect neglected by Lewens – directly related to the first – 
is that in order to provide a complete picture of cultural change, populations must be 
represented as “distributions of cultural variants”. This is not simply a useful description of 
something that can also be expressed otherwise (i.e., in terms of additive individual 
interactions); it denotes a standalone feature of the processes being modelled.    
This point is very well expressed by O’Brien, Lyman, Mesoudi and VanPool (2010), who 
argue for taking cultural variants as units of analysis in evolutionary approaches to 
archaeology. One of the main claims of these authors is that a satisfactory explanation of the 
different distributions of specific cultural variants in a population requires a focus on their 
functional features. Of course, this involves the consideration of individuals’ goals and 
preferences. Nonetheless, individuals should not be conceived of as the protagonist of 
cultural evolution, as “cultural traits are part of human phenotypes, but the traits themselves 
are populational. They can be traded at an individual level across time and space, but trait 
evolution is observed at the level of the changing membership of a population …” (O’Brien 
et al., 2010, p. 3803). Lycett and von Cramon-Taubadel (2015) further develop this 
population-focused conception, observing that: “As in biological quantitative genetics, the 
‘trait’ of evolutionary interest within this framework is not … the value derived from an 
individual specimen, but the pattern of variation exhibited by a population of those 
individuals compared against that of (an)other population(s)” (p. 659). 




population-focused view because otherwise they could not properly detect selective pressures 
– or the action of other evolutionary factors – in the population under study. Although 
phenotypic features obviously belong to individuals, evolutionary biologists do not build up 
the explanation of the phenotypic change by simply adding up in a statistically sophisticated 
way individuals’ births, lives and deaths. A distribution of traits is, in fact, usually compatible 
with more than one hypothesis about the evolutionary factors (selection, drift, mutation, 
migration, etc.) that have actually produced it (Endler 1986). In order to distinguish between 
these hypotheses, evolutionary biologists have to identify what genetic, biotic or 
environmental conditions have acted systematically and differentially on the population, so as 
to increase the frequency of a trait instead of another in some characteristic way over 
generations (Millstein 2006). Note that it is precisely for this distributed and intrinsically 
relational nature of evolutionary pressures that the evolutionary process is usually considered 
– in accordance with Sober’s conception of population thinking – a population-level process 
(Shapiro and Sober 2007). 
Analogously, by adopting this population-level approach, cultural evolutionists aim to 
integrate knowledge about social learning biases within a broader evolutionary picture. By 
focusing on cultural variants instead of on individuals, the models providing distribution 
explanations employ, so to speak, the same currency as biological evolutionary models. By 
considering cultural variants as a class of phenotypic traits and social learning biases as 
peculiar selective processes, these models permit simultaneous comparison of the action of 
cultural, genetic and environmental factors on cultural change, without assuming a privileged 
level of causation. 
An example of this approach is the analysis proposed by Rogers and Ehrlich (2008). Rogers 
and Ehrlich’s goal is to account for different rates of change of biologically adaptive and 
neutral cultural variants. The evolution of the techniques of canoe building in Polynesian 
populations is used as a case study. The authors distinguish between two types of cultural 
variants related to these techniques: functional design elements and symbolic design 
elements. Functional design elements have direct effects on the fitness of the individuals who 
are able to implement them (since the occupants of well-designed boats clearly have better 
chances of survival than the occupants of poorly-designed boats), while symbolic design 
elements are adaptively neutral. Rogers and Ehrlich’s study reveals that while the former 
cultural variants usually undergo negative (purifying) natural selection and possibly cultural 




inter-group variation.  
Even admitting that the term “cultural selection” ultimately denotes, in Rogers and Ehrlich’s 
model, nothing more than an aggregate of individuals interacting in a way that leads them to 
adopt one design element instead of another, this does not mean that the explanatory pay-off 
of the model results from “the surprising nature of aggregation” (Lewens 2015, p. 38). The 
model does not talk at all of individuals interacting. The model is explanatory rather because 
it clarifies how distinct factors – some having origin in the psychologies of individuals, others 
in the environment, still others in the structural characteristics of the populations – concur in 
order to produce a certain pattern of variation. Instead of pursuing a bottom-up methodology 
as that postulated by the kinetic interpretation, Rogers and Ehrlich aim, in their own words, to 
“untangle the relationship between cultural change and the different forces that might act on 
it systematically” (Rogers and Ehrlich 2008, p. 3418; emphasis added).  
Having introduced this alternative, non-aggregative, way to explain evolutionary change, the 
Newtonian analogy that supposedly grounds it will now be explored. 
 
 
4. The dynamical theory of cultural evolution 
 
Hitherto, it has been argued – against Lewens’ scepticism – that there is a consistent tradition, 
within cultural evolutionary theory, which conceives and models cultural change as a 
population-level phenomenon of phenotypic evolution. Lewens labels this tradition simply as 
“selectionist” (2015, p. 11 ff.), though he acknowledges that, according to this tradition, 
population-level dynamics of cultural change are not necessarily due to causes analogous to 
natural selection, but also to drift, migration and other evolutionary factors. In this section, it 
is argued that a more accurate way of characterising this conception of cultural change – and 
its explanatory value – is by representing cultural evolutionary theory as a dynamical theory.  
As it is possible to appreciate from the previous discussion, many cultural evolutionists 
characterise the causes of evolution as “forces”. Nonetheless, few have attempted to make 
this conception more rigorous. Part of this resistance is likely due to the fact that, in spite of 
having being widely adopted in evolutionary biology, the notion of “evolutionary force” has 
frequently been held as metaphorical (if not completely misleading; e.g., Endler 1986). Yet, 
as anticipated in the introduction of this article, Darwin himself arguably conceived his 




analogy in order to clarify metatheoretical aspects of evolutionary theory. 
According to Sober (1984), who popularised a contemporary version of the Newtonian 
analogy, a theory of force is composed of three main elements: a zero-force law, a set of 
consequences laws and a set of source laws. In genetic evolutionary theory, the zero-force 
law – the “inertial part” of the theory, in Richerson and Boyd’s passage in the introduction – 
is commonly identified with the Hardy-Weinberg principle (albeit other characterisations are 
possible; see, for instance, McShea and Brandon 2010). The consequence laws are the 
equations of population genetics, which describe the direction, the magnitude and the 
outcome of specific evolutionary factors, such as selection, drift, mutation and migration. 
Rather than “laws” (the term is still sometimes used in order to refer to “universal” or 
“unrestricted” generalisations, although there is no need to conceive them in this way; see, 
for instance, Lorenzano 2006), the consequence laws of a theory can be a set of mathematical 
models, accounting for the effects of the different factors acting on the system under study.  
While the zero-force law and the consequence laws constitute together, so to speak, the 
formal part of the theory, the source laws constitute its empirical element. The source laws 
explain why the inertial state has been perturbed by pointing out the causes of the change.  
On this latter point, it might seem that Sober considered the analogy between Newtonian 
mechanics and biological evolutionary theory to be stronger than what is effectively the case. 
In Newtonian mechanics, we have a limited set of source laws – like Archimedes’ principle, 
or the law of gravitation – which describe causal characteristics of the process under study 
that are shared by each instance of it. Archimedes’ principle, for instance, univocally 
identifies the causal component of buoyancy with the weight of the fluid displaced by a 
submerged body, the law of gravitation identifies the causal components of gravitation with 
the mass and the distance of the gravitating bodies, etc. Conversely, with the possible 
exceptions of mutation and migration (Hitchcock and Velasco 2014), the causal 
characterisation of evolutionary forces is dependent on the specific ecology in which the 
changing population is found. Natural selection is, possibly, the most striking example of 
this: in a certain circumstance selective pressures are identified with a cold climate favouring 
a long fur, in another one with a hot climate favouring a morphology that allows to dissipate 
heat, still in another with the presence of specific predators favouring mimicry, etc. 
Because this context-sensitivity, it could be argued that evolutionary regularities are not 
general enough to be considered, properly speaking, laws. Such an argument would, 




because their generality, but because they allow to identify patterns of counterfactual 
dependence. Once this is realised, the difference between Newtonian mechanics and 
evolutionary theory appears more a matter of degree than of kind. Archimedes’ principle 
supports, ceteris paribus, counterfactuals concerning any body submerged in a fluid. On the 
contrary, a regularity denoting the relation between a cold climate and long fur does not say 
anything about another evolutionary scenario connecting, to say, predators and mimicry – in 
spite of the fact that both are causal instantiations of selective processes.6 Still, all this does 
not take away that, notwithstanding its more limited scope of application, the regularity 
connecting cold climate and long fur supports a certain range of counterfactual claims 
concerning analogous ecologies. More in general, once certain traits are found that have 
evolved under specific ecological circumstances, we are justified to say that, ceteris paribus, 
similar traits will evolve under similar circumstances. This is enough to guarantee to the 
causal characterisations of evolutionary forces an explanatory role at least analogous to that 
of source laws in Newtonian mechanics (Caponi 2014). 
Within this framework, the notion of force is neither mysterious nor metaphorical. The zero-
force law defines the principle of stasis of the domain under study, that is, the “normal” 
condition of the system, where nothing is happening. A force is nothing more than a cause 
instantiating a source law, whose effects are formally depicted by its corresponding 
consequence law as a perturbation of the inertial state (Maudlin 2004; Luque 2016). Note 
that, within this framework, “cause” is any factor potentially perturbing the inertial state; the 
theory is agnostic about metaphysical claims concerning a supposed privileged (i.e., more 
basic) level of causation. 
Studying a certain domain of phenomena according to this dynamical framework involves 
three main steps. First, the researcher notices that the system under study is not behaving 
according to what is predicted by the zero-force law and calculates the divergence from the 
expected value. This, in Newtonian mechanics, amounts to identifying the net force acting 
upon an object. Second, the researcher elaborates hypotheses about which forces might have 
produced the change in the system by decomposing the net force into a set of consequential 
laws. Finally, the researcher considers the phenomenon empirically and tests the hypotheses 
by identifying source laws possibly responsible for the change in the system.7 In the rest of 
                                                             
6 In addition, it may be said that the regularity connecting cold climate and long fur admits more exceptions than 
Archimedes’ principle. Note, nevertheless, that also physical source laws must satisfy background conditions in 
order to support counterfactuals (in the case of Archimedes’ principle, for instance, the submerged object must 
not touch the bottom of the vessel in which it is submerged in, the fluid must not be a complex fluid, etc.). 




this section I shall first identify the formal components of cultural evolutionary theory as a 
theory of forces. It will then be shown that, as a matter of fact, cultural evolutionists often 
adopt the explanatory strategy just described in order to offer distribution explanations of 
real-world cases of cultural change.  
The zero-force law of cultural evolutionary theory has been identified by Boyd and Richerson 
(1985, p. 60 ff.) with the constant repetition of the same frequencies of cultural variants. 
However, other authors have proposed alternative zero-force laws. Most notably, Bentley, 
Hahn and Shennan (2004) have put forward a “neutralist” zero-force law, where the inertial 
state of cultural evolution is a “drift plus mutation” process. Although the choice of a zero-
force law is partly conventional, this is not to say that it is arbitrary; it should reflect some 
very general and uncontroversial fact about the domain under study. Moreover, it should be 
mathematically simple, in order to avoid unnecessary complexity when acting forces are 
taken into account. Both Boyd and Richerson and Bentley and colleagues consider that 
cultural inertia is a condition in which social learning is somehow unbiased, although they 
disagree on the implications of this assumption. In order to simplify the characterisation of 
cultural evolutionary forces below, I shall adopt Boyd and Richerson’s classic conception 
without any further discussion. The question of which is the zero-force law of cultural 
evolution is nonetheless still open and, since – by establishing what is the cultural “stasis” – 
the zero-force law determines the subsequent causal assumptions of the theory, it is a 
fundamental one. 
The consequence laws of cultural evolutionary theory have been initially formulated, though 
in a somehow different form, by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson 
(1985). Rogers and Ehrlich (2008), El Mouden et al. (2014) and Aguilar and Akçay (2018) 
can be considered as attempts to improve the formal characterisation of the forces of cultural 
evolution. A tentative taxonomy of cultural evolutionary forces according to measurable 
effects can be provided as follows:   
 
• Selective forces: natural selection, cultural selection due to content and context-based 
biases 
• Transformational forces: guided variation and random mutation 
• Random forces: genetic and cultural drift 
• Migration: demic diffusion and cultural diffusion 





Selective forces increase or decrease the frequency of a cultural variant depending on its 
genetic fitness value (natural selection), its cultural fitness value (cultural selection due to 
content biases – that is, selection favouring a variant due to its psychological attractiveness or 
its specific usefulness) and its previous distribution (cultural selection due to context-based 
biases).8 Cultural selection due to context-based biases can be further sub-classified into:  
 
a. Frequency-dependent cultural selection (due to conformist preferences), and  
b. Cultural selection dependent on structural features of the population (due to prestige 
biases).  
 
Transformational forces introduce variation in the process of cultural evolution. Cultural 
variation may be introduced by changing the features of a cultural variant in a way that it 
makes it expectedly – but not necessarily – fitter, either genetically or culturally (or both). 
The processes responsible for this kind of directed variation are sometimes referred to as 
“decision-making” forces, to distinguish them from processes changing features of cultural 
variants “blindly” – that is, in a way decoupled from the increase of genetic or cultural 
fitness.  
Both genetic and cultural drift produce chancy fluctuations in the frequencies of cultural 
variants, but this phenomenon has arguably different causes in the two cases. Genetic drift 
has an impact on the distribution of a cultural variant because it stochastically changes the 
number of potential transmitters of the variant. Cultural drift is the effect of the transmission 
of cultural variants with equal genetic or cultural fitness (that is, selectively neutral).  
An analogous difference subsists between demic diffusion and cultural diffusion, which are 
the two forms of migration that can affect the distributions of cultural variants. Demic 
diffusion increments the frequency of a cultural variant because more potential transmitters 
are physically introduced into the population under study. Cultural diffusion is generally due 
to the presence of technologies (radio, press, tv, internet, etc.) that allow the cultural variant 
to spread quickly within the population in spite of no physical displacement via individuals.  
Finally, recombinational forces, along with transformational forces, are the other important 
engine of novelty generation. Blending transmission, however, does not create a new variant 
nor does it simply modify an existing one, but rather it merges two (or more) existing variants 
                                                             
8 See Aguilar and Akçay (2018) for a rigorous definition of cultural fitness. In accordance with my remarks in 




into a new one. This process – as the name of the force that produces it suggests – may be 
considered as analogous to recombination in genetics. 
This taxonomy (drawn, with some important differences, from Mesoudi 2011) is tentative 
and can certainly be improved on in many ways. From the dynamical approach, it must be 
stressed that the formal representation of evolutionary forces are tools that allow for the 
source laws of cultural change to be found. It is precisely in the discovery of such laws that 
the explanatory power of many distribution explanations resides. As anticipated, the source 
laws are, in the context of an evolutionary theory, “laws” to the limited extent that identify a 
pattern of counterfactual dependence between a dynamic of distribution of phenotypic traits 
and the factors that are responsible for it. Within cultural evolutionary theory, some of these 
laws connect the diffusion of a cultural variant with psychological preferences, but others – 
differently from what a purely kinetic picture of cultural evolution would suggest – identify 
the causes of cultural change with other non-aggregative factors. These factors may include 
the natural environment, population structure, the presence of powerful actors or institutions, 
or the functional features of the cultural variants under study. 
A straightforward example of the implementation of the dynamical approach is MacCallum, 
Mauch, Burt and Leroi (2012). In this work, the authors employ a simulation, the 
DarwinTunes, in order to understand the evolution of music. They assume the action of two 
forces – that is, recombination and mutation – throughout the entire evolutionary process. 
After a certain number or generations in which musical variants are subjected, in addition, to 
cultural selection due to content biases, the researchers observed a slowdown of the 
evolutionary process.  
MacCallum and his colleagues explicitly attempt to explain this phenomenon by, first, 
decomposing the net force into its component forces and, subsequently, pointing out the 
possible causes instantiating such forces. Concerning the first step of the test, a series of 
hypotheses is proposed. The conclusion is that the stagnation of the evolutionary process is 
due to strong transformational forces (called by the authors “transmissional forces”) opposing 
cultural selection when an apparent adaptive peak is reached. MacCallum and his colleagues 
thus identify the causes underlying these forces with a kind of epistatic interaction between 
different components of the tunes’ cultural fitness (that is, consonance, rhythm and melody).  
The importance of this result is that – in accordance with the goals of the dynamical approach 
– it provides a source law of cultural evolution. It can be expected that in other cases in which 




intervening in the DarwinTunes, an analogous slowdown of the evolutionary process will be 
seen when an adaptive peak is reached. Moreover, it can be noticed that the causes of the 
populational dynamic are not identified with aggregative interactions but, rather, with a 
structural characteristic of the evolutionary process.       
In other cases, the reference to the dynamical approach is less explicit; yet, it is quite natural 
to interpret the authors’ commitments within this framework. Take, for instance, Watts et al. 
(2018). The aim of their article is to explain under which conditions Christianity (conceived 
of as a “pack” of cultural variants concerning Christian beliefs, rituals and behaviours) 
evolves, by comparing two alternative hypotheses. The first – supported by so-called top-
down theories – explain the spread of Christianity as an effect of powerful actors (think about 
the role of the Roman emperor Constantine in the rise of Christianity in the ancient world). 
The second hypothesis – supported by bottom-up theories – conceives of the spread of 
Christianity as the effect of the appeal of its egalitarian doctrines for underclasses. Top-down 
theories may be interpreted as explaining the phenomenon under study as the effect of 
cultural selection due to prestige biases. Bottom-up theories explain the phenomenon as the 
effect of cultural selection due to content biases and subsequent frequency-dependent 
selection. Watts and colleagues test the two theories compatibly with this interpretation, 
finally arguing – based on the analysis of 70 Austronesian societies – that a political structure 
(and thus selection due to prestige biases) and a reduced population size (which, according to 
the authors, facilitates the action of frequency-dependent selection) are the crucial factors for 
a rapid spread of Christian beliefs.  
Again, the ultimate explanatory import of this study is that it provides a source law of cultural 
evolution: we may expect that “packs” of cultural variants analogous to the ones involved in 
the spread of Christianity will evolve under similar conditions. The model is agnostic about 
the existence of a privileged level of causation: individual interactions, the functional 
properties of cultural variants, the structure of populations, and the presence of powerful 
actors and institutions all compete as possible causes of cultural change. 
A final example is provided by Newson and Richerson (2009) on the demographic transition 
in modern times. The authors conceptualise the phenomenon as the result of conflicting 
forces acting for and against the maintenance of kin networks. Since they distribute the 
burden of offspring care, kin networks allow the members of pre-modern societies to raise 
large families, thus being favoured by natural selection. However, once a kin network-based 




variants related to the values and norms of such social structure), it becomes vulnerable to 
other cultural selective forces. This weakens individuals’ kin ties and favours non-kin 
networks – which, in their turn, reduce birth rate. Newson and Richerson characterise these 
selective forces both from a theoretical and a causal point of view. The forces are mainly 
selective pressures due to prestige biases – instantiated by the emergence of state institutions 
– and due to content biases – instantiated by the decline in the social rewards associated with 
getting married and becoming a parent, and the relaxation of the social sanctions against 
promiscuity, adultery and divorce. As a test for corroborating the causal interpretation of the 
evolutionary dynamics, Newson and Richerson compare different societies at different stages 
of demographic transition and – as expected from a model assuming a dynamical framework 
– identify similar invariant factors (concerning religiosity, nationalism and gender norms). 
 
 
5. The foundational role of the dynamical framework 
 
In the last two sections, I have argued that it is not possible to supply distribution 
explanations of cultural evolution without taking into account population-level causal 
descriptions of cultural change. I have therefore argued that it is for this reason that cultural 
evolutionists find profitable to conceptualise cultural change within a dynamical framework. 
Yet, previously (section 3), I conceded to Lewens that many models concerning the 
evolutionary origins of cognitive biases – and, more in general, the conditions that allow for 
certain cultural dynamics to emerge – are provided in aggregative terms. How should we 
interpret these apparently divergent stances? 
One simple answer may be that the dynamical and the kinetic approach provide two 
complementary strategies of model building, dealing with two different aspects of cultural 
evolution. Consequently, the choice between the two frameworks should be made on a case-
by-case basis, depending on the specific aspect of cultural change to be modelled. In this 
perspective, if our goal is to clarify the relation between cultural evolution and our 
genetically evolved psychology, then we shall adopt (at least in principle) a kinetic approach. 
Otherwise, if we aim to understand the behaviour of the population as a whole and explain its 
changing composition through time, we will opt for a dynamical approach.  
I do not see anything properly wrong with this kind of pluralist interpretation. It is, indeed, 




incomplete and dismissive. To start with, cultural evolutionary theory is not just a collection 
of separately constructed models. As many other theories, also cultural evolutionary theory 
arguably displays something like a characteristic structure. I do not mean to say that such a 
structure is, at present, neatly defined: after all – everybody agrees – cultural evolutionary 
theory is still a developing theory. Yet, cultural change is commonly treated, in cultural 
evolutionary literature (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Durham 1991; Mesoudi 2011; Henrich 2016), as a unitary subject. This would suggest that 
models concerning different aspects of cultural evolution are in some way connected within 
the theory. 
The pluralist interpretation sketched above presupposes that the aspects of cultural evolution 
that are accounted for by, respectively, the dynamical and the kinetic approach are equally 
fundamental. This is, in my opinion, not the case. As corroborated by most metatheoretical 
reconstructions in the semantic tradition – and, more specifically, in the context of 
metatheoretical structuralism (Balzer et al. 1987) – scientific theories are hierarchically 
organised entities. This does mean that, usually, some elements of the theory (a model, a law, 
a heuristic principle) play a more fundamental role with respect to other, more peripherical, 
elements. Now, if we look at the original formulations of cultural evolutionary theory – such 
as Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) – we can appreciate 
that this theory does not constitute an exception. Both expositions focus, from the outset, on 
the characterisation of culture as a coevolutive inheritance channel. By doing this, they put a 
special emphasis on the fact that culture is a process (see section 2). Take, for instance, the 
following excerpt: “The dynamics of the changes within a population of the relative 
frequencies of the forms of a cultural trait under defined cultural interactions is the subject of 
this book” (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, p. 5). Analogously, Boyd and Richerson state: 
“First, the theory should predict the effects of different structures of cultural transmission on 
the evolutionary process” (Boyd and Richerson 1985, p. 2).  
Consequently, both expositions of the theory proceed by listing the forces of cultural 
evolution and modelling their effects on different populations. Of course, this goal – which 
roughly corresponds to providing what we have called distribution explanations of cultural 
phenomena – cannot be fully attained without a detailed evolutionary understanding of how 
we humans think and interact – that is, without origin explanations of social behaviours. As a 
matter of fact, especially Boyd and Richerson (1985) cite substantial empirical evidence – 




learning biases postulated by the theory, and a great deal of effort has been devoted since 
then to the same goal. However, the expositive strategy followed by the seminal writings of 
Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Boyd and Richerson suggests that the analysis of social learning 
biases is subordinate and instrumental to the explanation of the evolutionary process 
involving changes in cultural variant distributions.9  
This is, in an important sense, what makes cultural evolutionary theory different from other 
evolutionary theories of culture, such as evolutionary psychology, which conceives the 
evolution of our cognition as a goal in itself. Evolutionary psychologists maintain that 
cultural phenomena can be almost exhaustively accounted for in cognitivist terms, that is, by 
explaining the way in which our psychologies adapt themselves to the environment and to 
other’s beliefs and behaviours. This is precisely what dual-inheritance theorists and 
mainstream cultural evolutionists challenge (Brown and Richerson 2014; Richerson 2017). 
Cultural evolutionary theory is not merely an extension of evolutionary psychology (as 
somewhat suggested by Lewens 2015, chap. 8). It is an attempt to embed our knowledge 
about our evolved psychology in a broader theoretical framework concerning culture as a 
dynamical phenomenon. The interpretation of culture as a dynamical process – supported by 
the Newtonian analogy – is not accessory to cultural evolutionary theory but, very much on 
the contrary, it is the constitutive principle that guides any development of the theory.10  
By stressing the conceptual dependence, in cultural evolutionary theory, of the models 
providing origin explanations from the models providing distribution explanations, I 
absolutely do not intend to lessen the explanatory value of the former. Still, I think that – 
since origin explanations are typically supplied in kinetic terms, while distribution 
explanations are provided in dynamical terms – this conceptual dependence has a crucial 
consequence for the proper depiction of the relation between the dynamical and the kinetic 
approach in cultural evolutionary theory. We can express it as follows.  
Cultural evolutionary theory offers, by adopting a Newtonian approach, a general framework 
in which the causes of cultural change can be accommodated together so as to provide a 
unified picture of cultural evolution. The models providing origin explanations enrich this 
picture by specifying how social learning biases have evolved in our species, and how 
individuals endowed by these biases interact in order to implement some of the characteristic 
dynamics of cultural change (i.e., those whose overall effects are dependent on the action of 
social learning biases). The information obtained from these kinetic models is incorporated 
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into dynamical models that, by taking into account other forces instantiated by non-
aggregative factors (see section 4), allow to formulate distribution explanations of cultural 
change and specific source laws. From this point of view, the causal decomposition that the 
kinetic approach promotes is nothing more than an attempt to open the black box of a subset 
of the forces of cultural evolution. Differently from the Newtonian analogy, which plays a 
foundational role with respect to the whole cultural evolutionary theory, the kinetic analogy 





In this article, I have discussed the significance and scope of two recurrent analogies in the 
literature on cultural evolutionary theory: the Newtonian analogy, which compares cultural 
evolutionary theory to a theory of forces, like Newtonian mechanics; and the kinetic analogy, 
which compares cultural change to a thermodynamic phenomenon, fully explainable as the 
result of myriad of interactions between its components. My starting point has been to deny 
that the kinetic framework is able to account for all cultural evolutionary models. By relying 
on Godfrey-Smith (2009), I have distinguished between two kinds of explanation in cultural 
evolutionary theory, that is, origin explanations and distribution explanations. They 
respectively aim to account for the emergence of cultural dynamics (with special emphasis on 
the cognitive conditions necessary for it) and for the change in cultural variant distributions. 
After having related the Newtonian (or dynamical) and the kinetic analogy to two different 
interpretations of population thinking, I have argued that only the dynamical framework can 
properly account for distribution explanations in cultural evolutionary theory. 
Understanding the evolutionary roots of our social learning abilities is, of course, 
fundamental to the knowledge of how the dynamics of cultural change are implemented in 
the human species. Still, it is not enough to characterise cultural change as a whole, since – as 
argued – there are more than individual interactions in cultural change. In this sense, the 
dynamical interpretation is more general. It provides an explanatory scheme that can be 
completed by adding the details concerning the psychological processes underpinning 
cultural dynamics, as well as other potential causes of change. It does so without any 
prejudice concerning a privileged “level” of causation. Accordingly, it provides a sufficiently 
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